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In this paper, we rigorously prove the intuition that in security proofs for BB84 one may regard
an incoming signal to Bob as a qubit state. From this result, it follows that all security proofs for
BB84 based on a virtual qubit entanglement distillation protocol, which was originally proposed by
Lo and Chau [H.-K. Lo and H. F. Chau, Science 283, 2050 (1999)], and Shor and Preskill [P. W.
Shor and J. Preskill, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441 (2000)], are all valid even if Bob’s actual apparatus
cannot distill a qubit state explicitly. As a consequence, especially, the well-known result that a
higher bit error rate of 20% can be tolerated for BB84 by using two-way classical communications
is still valid even when Bob uses threshold detectors. Using the same technique, we also prove the
security of the Bennett-Brassard-Mermin 1992 (BBM92) protocol where Alice and Bob both use
threshold detectors.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a way to share
secret keys between separated parties (Alice and Bob)
with negligibly small leakage of its information to an
unauthorized third party, Eve. The first QKD proto-
col, BB84, was introduced by Bennett and Brassard in
1984 [1], and its unconditional security was first proven
by Mayers [2] in a bit complicated manner. After the
first proof, researchers have tried to prove its security in
a simple manner. Some proofs are based on the entan-
glement distillation protocol (EDP) idea [3, 4, 5, 6], and
others rely on uncertainty principle [2, 7] or information-
theoretic approach [8].
In EDP-based security proofs, we usually assume im-
plicitly that Bob has a detector which can discriminate
between vacuum, single-photon, and multi-photon states
in order to distill a qubit state, while this is not the case
for the security proof based on uncertainty principle [7],
i.e., the conventional on-off detectors (threshold detec-
tors) can be used in this case. On the other hand, the
EDP-based security proof can apply to many protocols,
including BB84 with two-way classical communications
[5], with decoy states [9], for B92 [10], and so on [11],
however, the security proof based on uncertainty princi-
ple cannot directly apply to these protocols. Thus, it is
important to consider from experimental or theoretical
viewpoints how to accommodate the use of threshold de-
tectors in EDP-based security proof, or to consider how
to apply the uncertainty principle idea to the other pro-
tocols.
In this paper, we first prove unconditional security of
BB84 with threshold detectors based on the argument of
virtual EDP, which is valid regardless of one-way or two-
way classical communications. In order to show its secu-
rity, instead of assuming photon-number discriminating
detectors, we introduce an explicit squash operator in the
virtual protocol, which transforms Bob’s incoming multi-
photon state to a qubit state. Then we suppose that they
run a virtual EDP on the obtained qubit pairs in order to
extract secret keys. If one-way classical communications
are used in this setup, the secret key rate R from the
single photon part is R = 1−H2(evibit)−H2(eviph), where
evibit and e
vi
ph are the phase and the bit error rates in the
virtual protocol. As a consequence of introducing an ex-
plicit squash operator, all of the formulas for key genera-
tion rate given in the preceding literatures of EDP-based
security proofs are valid with threshold detectors, even
when multi-photon emission is taken into account [6] or
with decoy states [9]. Our formulation also applies to
the case of two-way classical communications [5], hence
the bit error rate threshold of 20% or higher is true with
threshold detectors as well.
By using the same technique, we also prove the security
of the Bennett-Brassard-Mermin 1992 (BBM92) protocol
[12], where Alice and Bob both use threshold detectors
(see Fig.3). In the BBM92 protocol, a third party sup-
plies entangled states to Alice and Bob, and they measure
it with the same set of bases as in BB84. If both the re-
ceivers have photon-number discriminating detectors and
can reject incoming multi-photon states, this protocol is
theoretically equivalent to BB84. When threshold detec-
tors are used, however, the security of this protocol is not
straightforward, and we will give the security proof for
this scheme in this paper.
The assumptions that we make for theoretical descrip-
tion of BB84 are as follows. First, it is assumed that Al-
ice’s signals are block diagonalized with respect to photon
2number, and thus one can treat events having different
photon numbers as distinct classical events. Moreover,
we assume that Alice’s mixed states in the z basis and
the one in the x basis are the same, i.e., there is no basis
information flow from Alice’s source.
We also suppose that when Alice emits a multi-photon
state, all information regarding that bit is freely leaked
to Eve due to the photon-number splitting attack [13].
It is proven, however, that we can still generate a secret
key as long as Alice’s signals contain a sufficiently high
ratio of single-photon states [6]. This ratio can be well-
monitored by the decoy state method [9], resulting in
longer distances of communications. Thus, only single-
photon emission part is important, to which we restrict
our attention in this paper.
Another assumption we make is that all imperfections
of Alice’s and Bob’s devices, i.e., non-unit quantum ef-
ficiency of Bob’s detectors, dark counts, miss-alignment,
etc., are under Eve’s control. This is the so-called un-
trusted devise scenario, and with this hypothesis we are
in a situation where Alice’s and Bob’s devices are all per-
fect. In addition, we suppose that Bob’s phase modulator
acts on multi-photon states as linear operations on ten-
sor product states. In other words, they transform each
photon contained in a signal independently, whether they
are in a superposition or not (for more details, see Sec.
II A).
Finally, when Bob’s two detectors click simultaneously
(coincidence count), he assigns a random bit to the cor-
responding event.
These assumptions are also made in our security proof
of BBM92 except that Alice, as well as Bob, plays the role
of a receiver. That is, imperfections of apparatuses are
attributed to Eve’s attack, and Alice’s and Bob’s phase
modulators transform their incoming multi-photon states
as tensor products. If a coincident-detection event oc-
curs on either Alice’s or Bob’s side, he or she manually
replaces it by a random bit. We emphasize in the case of
BBM92 that we do not put any assumption on incoming
signals.
This paper is organized as follows. We describe and
formulate our model for actual QKD systems based on
BB84 in Sec. II, and convert it into a virtual EDP in Sec.
III. Sec. IV is devoted to the security proof for BBM92.
Then finally we conclude in Sec. V.
II. DESCRIPTION OF OUR MODEL
In this section we illustrate our setup (Fig.1). As in
usual implementations of the BB84 protocol, Alice emits
out signal pulses whose phases are chosen randomly out
of {0, pi, pi/2, 3pi/2}. Among them we regard a set of
phase choices {0, pi} (respectively, {pi/2, 3pi/2}) as the
encodings of bit value b ∈ {0, 1} in the z basis (respec-
tively, in the x basis). After traveling Eve’s regime, the
signal pulse is again phase-modulated according to Bob’s
random basis choice, and then enters the detection unit
consisting of a 50:50 beam splitter followed by two thresh-
old detectors (Det Zth), which read out the bit value b.
Even when coincident detections occur on both detec-
tors, Bob does not discard the event and instead assigns
a random value for the output iB.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the goal of this
paper is to rigorously prove the security of QKD even
when the receiver (or the receivers) uses threshold detec-
tors which cannot distinguish photon numbers. Hence
throughout the paper, we will always take into account
the possibility that states which a receiver obtains con-
tain more than one photon. To this end, we will below
formulate generalN -photon states and describe how they
are transformed by Bob’s phase modulations.
FIG. 1: (Color online) Schematic of the actual BB84 protocol.
Det Zth denotes Bob’s threshold detectors. When two detec-
tors click simultaneously (coincidence count), Bob assigns a
random bit (Rand) to the corresponding event.
A. Symmetry under particle permutations and the
formulation of Bob’s quantum operations
Consisting of identical particles with bosonic statistics,
a state received by Bob is always symmetric under parti-
cle permutations [14] [17]. Hence an N -particle state in
Bob’s Hilbert space HB can be expanded with basis
|SzN−b,b〉 :=
1√
N !(N − b)!b!
(|0N−bz 1bz〉+ permutations) ,
where |0N−bz 1bz〉 = |0z · · · 0z1z · · · 1z〉 = |0z〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗
|0z〉 ⊗ |1z〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |1z〉, with 0z and 1z repeating N − b
and b times respectively. |SyN−b,b〉B are defined in the
y basis similarly (we define y basis and x basis as
|jy〉 ≡ (|0z〉 + (−1)ji|1z〉)/
√
2 (j = 0, 1) and |jx〉 ≡
(|0z〉 + (−1)j|1z〉)/
√
2, respectively). Thus for example,
|Sz0,2〉 = |0z0z〉, whereas |Sz1,1〉 = 1√2 (|0z1z〉+ |1z0z〉)
and |Sy1,2〉 = 1√3 (|0y1y1y〉+ |1y0y1y〉+ |1y1y0y〉).
Using this basis, quantum non-demolition (QND)
measurement of N photon, to be mentioned be-
low, can be represented by Kraus operators EN =∑N
b=0 P (|SzN−b,b〉B), where P (|ψ〉) := |ψ〉〈ψ|.
As is usually the case for a linear operator on
tensor product states, or as one typically encoun-
ters when adding angular momenta [14], Bob’s phase
3modulator acts on these symmetric states indepen-
dently in a qubit by qubit manner. For example,
bit flip X operates on |Sz3,0〉 as X |0z〉 ⊗ X |0z〉 ⊗
X |0z〉 =: X⊗3|Sz3,0〉 =: D(X)|Sz3,0〉, and similarly
the Hamadard gate transforms |Sz1,1〉 as D(H)|Sz1,1〉 =
1√
2
(H |0z〉 ⊗H |1z〉+H |1z〉 ⊗H |0z〉), where
H :=
1√
2
(
1 −1
1 1
)
in the z basis. If one regards qubit operations as rotations
of spin-1/2, these symmetric N -photon states correspond
to a spin-N/2 representation.
In fact these formulations are equivalent to those using
creation and annihilation operators. For example, let azb
be the annihilation operator corresponding to |bz〉, then
|SzN−b,b〉 corresponds to
|SzN−b,b〉 =
1√
(N − b)!b!
(
az†0
)N−b (
az†1
)b
|0〉
and D(iX) is reproduced by
D(iX) = exp

ipi
2
∑
c,d
az†c Xcda
z
d

 .
Photon detection in general corresponds to a pro-
jective measurement with respect to photon-number
states in the z basis {|SzN,0〉, |SzN−1,1〉, · · · , |Sz0,N 〉}. Since
Bob’s threshold detectors cannot discriminate photon
numbers in our case, it is assumed that they can
only distinguish between vacuum |Sz0,0〉, single detection
events |SzN,0〉, |Sz0,N〉, and coincident detection events
{|SzN−1,1〉, · · · , |Sz1,N−1〉}.
III. VIRTUAL PROTOCOL
In this section, in order to prove the security of our
QKD, we convert the actual BB84 protocol to an equiv-
alent virtual protocol (Fig. 2). We do this conversion in
two steps. First, immediately after Bob’s phase modula-
tor, we introduce an explicit squash operator F , which
projects an N -particle state received from Eve into a
qubit state (see EDP1 in Fig. 2). Then by using the in-
variance of F under the Hadamard transformationH , we
replace Bob’s phase modulator with a Hadamard opera-
tion that follows F (EDP2 in Fig. 2). In this EDP2, Alice
and Bob obtain a pair of qubit states with Hadamard op-
erators, as if Bob’s incoming states were always a single-
photon state. Hence we can prove security of our QKD
system by following exactly the same argument as in
Shor-Preskill [4] or in GLLP [6]. That is, Alice and Bob
can perform a virtual EDP to extract secret keys.
First, on Alice’s side we assume that, instead of
randomly choosing the phase of signal states out of
FIG. 2: (Color online) Schematics of our virtual EDPs for
BB84. In the first protocol (EDP1), Bob’s states are projected
to a two-dimensional vector spaceHD by a squash operator F .
By using the Hadamard invariance of F , we may interchange
the order of Bob’s phase modulations and F , and obtain the
second protocol (EDP2). In EDP2, Alice and Bob both have
a qubit space HA or HD with Hadamard operations acting
on them. Thus by performing a virtual EDP in these spaces,
they can extract secret keys.
{0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/4}, Alice takes the following procedure; she
prepares one of the Bell states
|Φ+〉AE := 1√
2
(|0z〉A|0z〉E + |1z〉A|1z〉E) ,
keeps the first one half in HA (reference state), and sends
the second one half in HE (signal state) to Eve. The
converted protocol is still equivalent to the original one,
since she can effectively emit a random bit iA ∈ {0, 1} by
measuring the reference state with z- and x-bases.
On receiving the signal pulse, Eve generates an arbi-
trary state in Bob’s Hilbert state HB, which in general
may be a superposition of any photon number N . As
a result, Alice and Bob end up sharing a state ρAB ∈
HA ⊗HB. Without sacrificing security, we may simplify
the analysis further by assuming that ρAB is actually
given from Eve to Alice and Bob.
Then on Bob’ s side, we assume that immediately af-
ter receiving a pulse, he performs a QND measurement
on the photon number N , described by Kraus operators
{EN}N∈N. Since this measurement does not disturb the
statistics of Bob’s and Eve’s data, we can introduce this
measurement without loss of generality. To be more pre-
cise, Bob’s sifted keys are the same regardless of per-
forming QND or not. Moreover, since the measurement
outcomes are kept secret from Eve, she cannot behave
4differently depending on whether he performs the QND
or not. In other words, the QND measurement here is
introduced only as a convenient tool for proving the se-
curity, and Bob need not perform this measurement in
the actual protocol. For the sake of simplicity, we fix
the value of N from now on, and sometimes suppress its
indices. Following this measurement, Bob projects his
state to a qubit state using a squash operator F which
converts a state in his (N +1)-dimensional Hilbert space
HB to that in a qubit space HD. This consists of Kraus
operators
Fb,b′ := 2
−(N−1)/2× (1){√(
N
b′
)
|1y〉〈SyN−b,b|+
√(
N
b
)
|0y〉〈SyN−b′,b′ |
}
,
for all combinations of 0 ≤ b, b′ ≤ N satisfying b − b′ ≡
1 mod 4. With these operators, an arbitrary state ρ ∈
HB is converted to
F (ρ) =
∑
b,b′
Fb,b′ρF
†
b,b′ (2)
in HD. As shown in Appendix A1, these operators in-
deed satisfy
∑
b,b′ F
†
b,b′Fb,b′ = IB, and thus form a legiti-
mate quantum operation.
This protocol (EDP1 in Fig. 2) can indeed be consid-
ered as equivalent to the original one, since, as we shall
show in Appendix A 2, the POVM elements in the vir-
tual protocol and in the actual protocol corresponding to
Bob’s sifted key bit iB = 0, 1 take exactly the same forms.
Hence Eve can never distinguish the two protocols.
Moreover, as we shall show in Appendix A3, our
squash operation F is in fact invariant under the
Hadamard transformation H . That is, for an arbitrary
input state ρ ∈ HB, we have
HF (ρ)H† = F
(
D(H)ρD†(H)
)
. (3)
In other words, applying the Hadamard transformation
in Bob’s (N + 1)-dimensional space HB is equivalent to
applying it in the squashed qubit state HD. Hence we
may assume that Bob’s Hadamard transformation and
the squash operator F are actually interchanged, as in
EDP2 in Fig. 2.
Then by supposing that, instead of immediately con-
ducting z-basis measurements, Alice and Bob perform
a virtual EDP on a qubit-pair state in their squashed
qubit spaces HA ⊗HD, the standard argument for secu-
rity proofs due to Shor and Preskill [4] can be directly
applied. This means that, even when threshold detectors
are used, all the previous security proofs for BB84 based
on a virtual EDP (e.g., [4, 5, 6, 9]) are valid, including
the ones involving two-way classical communications [5]
or decoy states [9].
IV. BBM92 PROTOCOL WITH BOTH PARTIES
USING THRESHOLD DETECTORS
By the same arguments as above, it is straightforward
to prove the security of the BBM92 protocol where Alice
and Bob both use threshold detectors.
In the actual BBM92 protocol, entangled states are
supplied to Alice and Bob from a third party who is not
necessarily trusted. Upon receiving pulses, Alice and
Bob modulate and measure them in randomly chosen
x or z basis, and then output sifted key bits by select-
ing out events where their choices of basis match. If a
coincident-detection event occurs, the receiver assigns a
random value to the output bit iA or iB (Fig. 3).
FIG. 3: (Color online) Schematic of the actual BBM92 pro-
tocol. “Ent. Source” denotes a third party that supplies
entangled states to Alice and Bob. This third party may be
malicious in general.
FIG. 4: (Color online) Schematics of our virtual EDPs cor-
responding to BBM92. In EDP1, Alice and Bob both ap-
ply squash operations F and obtain qubit states in HC and
HD. By using the Hadamard invariance of F , we may inter-
change the order of phase modulations and F ’s, and obtain
EDP2, where both parties apply the Hadamard gate H on
the squashed qubit states HC and HD.
In this case as well, by using the equivalence of POVM
elements for z-basis measurements (Appendix A2), this
protocol can be equivalently converted into the first vir-
tual protocol (EDP1 in Fig.4), where Alice and Bob ap-
ply squash operations F after phase modulations. Then
5due to the Hadamard-invariance of F in Eq. (3), we may
interchange the order of phase modulations and F ’s. As
a result, we obtain our second virtual protocol (EDP2 in
Fig.3), where both parties applyH on the squashed qubit
states HC and HD. Here HC denotes Alice’s qubit space.
In this EDP2, the standard Shor-Preskill-type argument
for security proof can be applied to prove the security.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we gave a rigorous security proof for
BB84, which is valid even when the actual Bob uses
threshold detectors. The key ingredient here was the
introduction of an explicit squash operator F in the vir-
tual protocol, which projects Bob’sN -photon state into a
qubit space and still preserves their transformation prop-
erty under the Hadamard transformation. Our results
show that all the formulas for key generation rates ob-
tained in previous proofs based on a virtual qubit entan-
glement distillation protocol are valid even with thresh-
old detectors. In particular, one can tolerate a higher
error rate up to 20% with two-way classical communica-
tions [5].
In addition, by using the same technique, we also
proved the security of BBM92 protocol, where Alice and
Bob both use threshold detectors.
Note added. Recently, similar results regarding con-
struction of squash operators were obtained indepen-
dently by Beaudry, Moroder and Lu¨tkenhaus [15]. A
security proof of BBM92 with threshold detectors was
also given independently by Koashi et al. [16], although
the techniques used there were different from ours.
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APPENDIX A: PROPERTIES OF OUR SQUASH
OPERATOR
In this appendix we discuss and prove some important
properties of our squash operator F defined in Eq. (1).
Without loss of generality, we here consider only Bob’s
filter, and denote the (N + 1)-dimensional space of in-
coming pulses by HB and the target qubit space by HD.
Note that the arguments proved here can immediately
apply when Alice uses F in BBM92 as well.
1. Completeness as a quantum operator
First we show that F is a legitimate quantum opera-
tion. That is, we demonstrate that
Fsum = IB, (A1)
where IB is the unit operator in HB, and Fsum is defined
as
Fsum :=
∑
b,b′
F †b,b′Fb,b′ .
To this end, we work in a basis {|SyN,0〉, . . . , |Sy0,N 〉}, and
prove fb,b′ = δb,b′ for
fb,b′ := 〈SyN−b,b|Fsum|SyN−b′,b′〉.
First, it is obvious from the definition of F in (1) that
fb,b′ = 0 for b 6= b′. On the other hand, if b = b′, a simple
calculation shows that for a fixed value of b,
fb,b = 2
−(N−1) ∑
b−c≡±1
(
N
c
)
,
where the sum is over all values of c satisfying b − c ≡
±1 mod 4. For b even, this equals
fb,b = 2
−(N−1) ∑
c:odd
(
N
c
)
= 1,
as anticipated. The case of odd b can be shown similarly.
This completes the proof.
2. Equivalence of z measurements in the actual and
the virtual protocols
Next we show that Bob’s z measurement in the virtual
protocol affects the entire quantum system in exactly the
same manner as in the actual one. That is to say, with
the POVM corresponding to a sifted key bit iB = 0, 1
defined as
P viiB =
∑
c,c′
F †c,c′P (|(iB)z〉)Fc,c′ ,
P aciB = P (|Sz(1−iB)N,iBN 〉) +
1
2
N−1∑
c=1
P (|SzN−c,c〉)
respectively for the virtual and the actual protocols, we
shall show that P viiB = P
ac
iB . If one notes that P
vi
0 +P
vi
1 =
IB holds from Eq.(A1), it is rather convenient to consider
a POVM element corresponding to the Z operator
P acZ = P (|SzN,0〉)− P (|Sz0,N 〉),
P viZ =
∑
b,b′
F †b,b′ZFb,b′ .
6and show that
P acZ = P
vi
Z . (A2)
Note that P viiB = P
ac
iB
can be shown from (A2) and by
using the relation P viZ = P
vi
0 − P vi1 and P vi0 + P vi1 = IB,
and similar relations for the actual protocol.
Now, from the definition of F in Eq. (1),
P viZ = 2
−N+1∑
b,b′
√(
N
b
)(
N
b′
)
×
[
|SyN−b,b〉〈SyN−b′,b′ |+ |SyN−b′,b′〉〈SyN−b,b|
]
,
where the sum is over all 0 ≤ b, b′ ≤ N satisfying b− b′ ≡
1 mod 4. This can be rewritten further as
P viZ = 2
−N+1∑
b,b′
√(
N
b
)(
N
b′
)
|SyN−b,b〉〈SyN−b′,b′ | (A3)
where the sum is over all b, b′ with b− b′ ≡ 1 mod 2.
Next, expanding |SzN−b,b〉 with |SyN−b,b〉 gives
|SzN,0〉 = 2−N/2
N∑
b=0
√(
N
b
)
|SyN−b,b〉,
|Sz0,N 〉 = 2−N/2(−i)N
N∑
b=0
√(
N
b
)
(−1)b|SyN−b,b〉,
and from these relations we obtain
P acZ = 2
−N+1∑
b,b′
√(
N
b
)(
N
b′
)
|SyN−b,b〉〈SyN−b′,b′ |, (A4)
where the sum is again over all 0 ≤ b, b′ ≤ N satisfying
b − b′ ≡ 1 mod 2. Eqs. (A3) and (A4) prove Eq. (A2).
This completes the proof.
3. Invariance under the Hadamard transformation
In this subsection we prove in Eq. (3), i.e., the
Hadamard-invariance of F . Since |SN−b,b〉 transforms
under the Hadamard transformation H as
D(H)|SN−b,b〉 = ω2b−N |SN−b,b〉,
with ω := exp(ipi/4), we have
Fb,b′D(H) = 2
−(N−1)/2ω2b−N×{√(
N
b′
)
|1y〉〈SyN−b,b| − i
√(
N
b
)
|0y〉〈SyN−b′,b′ |
}
= ω2b−N−1HFb,b′ .
That is, each operator Fb,b′ yields a phase factor ω
2b−N+1
when H is applied. However, such factor does not change
the operations of F as a Kraus operator. For example,
when applied to an arbitrary mixed state ρ ∈ HB, it
yields
Fb,b′D(H)ρD
†(H)F †b,b′ = HFb,b′ρF
†
b,b′H
†.
By summing these over all combinations of b, b′ satisfying
b− b′ ≡ 1 mod 4, we obtain Eq. (3).
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